




his research note evaluates methods for explaining the fact
~ that to a striking degree in the 1980s, superpower policies and
attitudes concerning the United Nations evolved in opposite
directions. While the U. S. has over the last decade reduced - and in
some cases (e.g., the United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea and UNESCO) renounced - its interest in international institu-
tions, the U.S.S.R. has recently shown a new enthusiasm for the UN
itself, its peacekeeping operations, any its agencies. The Soviets asked
the General Assembly for three consecutive years to consider its pro-
posal for creating a &dquo;comprehensive system of international peace and
security.&dquo; Overall, shifts in Soviet UN policies are &dquo; ... evident in
such diverse places as Afghanistan; Angola; Lebanon; the Persian
Gulf; the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency; [and] UNESCO ... &dquo; (Luck and
Gati 1988: 19).2
In order to develop ways of solving the puzzle of differing trends
in superpower actions and outlooks, this paper explores various indi-
cators of U.S. and Soviet attitudes toward international institutions. It
should be noted at the outset that the data sets which I use to examine
the outlooks within each country are not directly comparable. Despite
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the startling changes in the U.S.S.R. during the Gorbachev era, it is
still difficult to study Soviet policy-making and policy-makers’ atti-
tudes directly. I employ content analysis of Soviet political journals as
a surrogate for the public-opinion and case-study data which are avail-
able on the U.S. side. In short, I am presenting my data as prelimi-
nary evidence of what I believe to be important differences between
U.S. and Soviet approaches to international organizations (IOs).
As the framework for my discussion, I consider two possible mod-
els of state involvement with international institutions. One explana-
tory model is based on a realist analysis of international relations; it
emphasizes external pressures on states in the anarchic world system
and assumes that states behave as rational, unitary actors. The com-
peting model, by contrast, concentrates on the internal, domestic polit-
ical ramifications of given types of issues, or &dquo;issue-areas.&dquo; The issue-
area model rejects realism’s assumptions about states as rational, unitary
actors.
THE REALIST MODEL
A useful model for conceptualizing states’ involvement in interna-
tional organizations should convey the costs and benefits of such involve-
ment. A model of nations’ policies toward international institutions3
must also take into consideration the fact that 10s are created and
maintained by means of states’ collective action. Olson’s Logic of Col-
lective Action (1965) provides some important theoretical assumptions
which undergird a realist model of the superpowers’ 10 policies. Such
a model sees states’ behavior in the international system fundamentally
as a function of systemic constraints and opportunities. The interna-
tional allocation of state capabilities is the main influence on interna-
tional relations.
As the U.S. loses its hegemonic status, the configuration of the
group of states involved in the collective act of providing and main-
taining the UN changes. No longer a &dquo;privileged&dquo; group in which one
member dominates, the group is more of an intermediate-sized one, in
which no single member benefits so greatly from the collective good
that he is willing to provide the good himself. Olson makes it clear
3 International institutions are defined as "recognized patterns of practice around which
expectations converge." (Young, 1982: 280) International organizations, such as
the United Nations and its agencies, are the specific arenas for these "patterns of
practice."
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that once a group is in the &dquo;intermediate&dquo; category, the incentive for
individual members to contribute toward the provision of the collective
good falls dramatically. The realist model, incorporating Olson’s frame-
work, predicts that as the relative size (i.e., power) of states decreases,
so will their willingness to contribute to 10s.
When tested against the empirical evidence, the predictions derived
from Olson’s argument about different sorts of small groups capture
broad trends well. As the leader of a &dquo;privileged&dquo; group for the period
1945-60, the United States cast no vetoes in the Security Council of
the United Nations. It is generally acknowledged that in the early
postwar years, when the U.S. share of world industrial production
neared fifty percent &dquo; ... the U. S . could command the UN’s
agenda ... &dquo; (Franck 1985: 246).
In the contemporary world, the sharp increase in the number of
UN members also accounts for the fact that a situation closer to the
one depicted in Olson’s &dquo;intermediate&dquo;-group scenario exists. By the
mid-1960s, &dquo; ... with UN membership exceeding 120, the United
States had fallen to a minority position on more than half of UN con-
tested votes&dquo; (Riggs and Plano 1988: 348). At the same time, Ameri-
can global economic power has declined. Over the years 1950-81,
American petroleum output fell from 51 percent of world output to 16
percent; crude steel production from 45 to 20 percent; and iron ore,
from 42 to 11 percent (Krasner 1985: 71). The European Economic
Community’s collective gross national product now exceeds that of the
U.S. (Schmeisser 1988). As an indication of a corresponding slacken-
ing of support for IOs, American contributions to the UN budget have
decreased from 39 percent during 1946-54 and 33 percent during
1956-72 to 25 percent in the 1980s (Krasner 1985: 299). The Kas-
sebaum Amendment, passed by the Congress in 1985, stipulated that
the American share would unilaterally be reduced to 20 percent until
the UN reformed its budget-making procedures.
The United Nations’ scheme for assessing the budget shares which
members are expected to contribute is implicitly based on a linkage of
states’ power (measured by GNP) with their consumption of the col-
lective goods provided by the UN. In other words, &dquo;the main criterion
for capacity to pay has always been gross national income&dquo; (Franck
1985: 256). The assessments are based on GNP figures provided by
the individual country, so the opportunity exists for nations to present
data that help reduce their fiscal burden. The U.S.S.R.’s assessment
shrank from 11.6 to 11.1 percent from 1979-82, and continued to
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decline, to 10.54 for 1983-85. Over the same period, by way of con-
trast, the Japanese assessment has increased from 8.5 percent to nearly
10.5 percent. The US registered complaints about the accuracy of
national income figures given by the Soviets, and the US voted against
the decreased Soviet 1983-85 contribution ( Yearbook of the United Nations
1982: 1217-20). By 1988, the Soviet assessment had increased to 11.8
percent (New York Times, 1988: August 7).
Apart from assessments, there is the question of the extent to
which UN members live up to their financial obligations. In this regard
it is worth noting that as the 1980s ended, the UN’s financial condition
had improved. In 1988 the Soviet Union, which had owed over $50
million to the UN as of 1984, fully paid its debt ( The Economist 1988:
March 12, p. 44). In 1989 the United States still owed $350 million in
unpaid assessments, but in that year the U.S. pledged to pay all of its
regular budget assessment and to begin making good on its pre-1989
arrears (Lister 1990: 223).
While modeling state involvement in 10s as a function of rational
cost/benefit decisions is of some use in understanding contemporary
superpower policies toward international institutions, it is only par-
tially successful in addressing the query which this paper seeks to
answer. The realist model does successfully predict that states in a
situation akin to the one in which Olson’s &dquo;intermediate&dquo; group finds
itself will be less eager to contribute to the provision of a collective
good. The empirical evidence shows a broad correlation between the
relative power of states and their actual, not merely nominal (assessed),
contributions to IOs. Olson and Zeckhauser’s analysis shows a statis-
tically significant correlation between individual states’ GNP figures
and their UN contribution in terms of percentage of assessment actu-
ally paid (1968: 40). However, the main disadvantage of the realist
model is that its predictions are overly broad. Specifically, it does not
explain why Soviet and US attitudes toward the UN evolved in oppo-
site directions in the 1980s.
SOVIET NEW THINKING AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
In this section I discuss contemporary attitudes among Soviet for-
eign policy elites concerning global interdependence and related ques-
tions. Recent data indicate a clear surge in the importance accorded to
these issues on the part of the Soviet foreign policy establishment.
This result is relevant to the present inquiry in that the new Soviet
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policy toward international institutions is conceptually rooted in a view
of the world which emphasizes global interdependence. &dquo;Gorbachev’s
more active global diplomacy - stressing global interdependence, the
need for mutual security, and increased contacts among states - pro-
vides the ideological underpinning for a more engaged UN policy&dquo;
(Luck and Gati 1988: 23).
Table 1 reports the results of a content analysis of three prominent
Soviet journals. For the period 1983-89, I measured the yearly num-
ber of articles in each publication which favorably mentioned the
concepts of greater global economic interdependence and/or mutual
(global) security. The appearances of such articles in the journals
Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia (MEMO), Mezhdunarod-
naia Zhizn’ (MZh) and Kommunist4 were used to indicate where
interdependence-oriented issues have been located on the Soviet policy
agenda in recent years. These are the official publications of, respec-
tively, the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations,
the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union.
TABLE 1
YEARLY NUMBER OF PRO-INTERDEPENDENCE ARTICLES, 1983-ig8g
In terms of the number of &dquo;pro-interdependence&dquo; articles pub-
lished, the trend is clearly in the upward direction for each journal.
Measured differently, the increase is seen in the fact that the percent-
4 A quantitative analysis of the general positions taken by the leading organs of the
Soviet press on a major foreign policy question-what lessons should the USSR
derive from the American experience in Vietnam - established the existence of
appreciable overall variation in outlook. (Zimmerman and Axelrod, 1981). With
the advent of glasnost’ i the Gorbachev era, Soviet journals and newspapers have
become fairly open about disagreeing with stances taken by one another.
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age of MEMO articles on interdependence doubled between 1983 and
1986 (from 1.57 to 3.20 percent), and then dropped slightly between
1986-88 (to 2.53 percent and then 2.58 percent). In 1989 MEMO
started a new section of the journal devoted to articles on &dquo;problems of
the integrated world,&dquo; and the percentage increased again, to 4.59
percent. For MZh, the analogous figure went from 3.9 percent in 1984
to a high of 11 percent in 1987, before decreasing to 7.86 percent in
1989. Finally, the percentage of articles favorably mentioning interde-
pendence in Kommunist more than doubled over the 1983-89 period.
Measuring the number of articles concerned specifically with inter-
national organizations reveals a different trend. The number of arti-
cles in the section of MZh concerning &dquo;international forums and
organizations/international law&dquo; amounted to 27 in 1981, dipped to 12
by 1984, and increased to 33 and 28 in 1986 and 1987, respectively.
(The journal eliminated this category at the end of 1987, at which time
it began including articles on IOs in the main section on international
relations). While there are several plausible interpretations of this find-
ing, it appears to indicate that there was little linkage of the new aca-
demic interest in interdependence to Soviet thinking on 10s prior to
Gorbachev’s accession to power in 1985.
The Gorbachev-era &dquo;new thinking&dquo; on international institutions is
new not in that it envisions a prominent role for international organi-
zations, but in that it depicts them as arenas more for cooperation with
the West than for competition. As evidence of this innovation, con-
sider a representative quotation from a typical Brezhnev-era article on
the UN: &dquo; ... [V]irtually all major initiatives and proposals have
been advanced by the Soviet Union ... The 35-year record of the
UN is the history of struggle between the two opposing courses in the
international sphere&dquo; (Petrovsky 1980: 11-12). By contrast, Gorbachev
noted in his December 1988 speech that &dquo;for many years [the UN] was
a propaganda battlefield ... [T]his chapter in the history of the United
Nations ... was at variance with the very essence and mission of the
UN&dquo; (Gorbachev 1988: 2).
THE ISSUE-AREA MODEL
I now describe an alternative to the realist model, the need for
which the previous section’s empirical findings make clear. The evi-
dence points to an unprecedented Soviet interest both in global inter-
dependence as a concept and in international organizations as arenas
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for managing interdependence. To understand why this interest has
arisen, and how it affects Soviet policy concerning international insti-
tutions, I employ an issue-area model in order to supplement realism.
Zimmerman (1973) argues that the policy processes which tend to
accompany, for example, the issue-areas of crisis politics and diplo-
matic recognition are similar because the impact of the outcomes will
be the same for nearly all citizens. The symmetry of the impact obtains
regardless of whether that impact is monumental (as in a crisis) or
trivial (as in diplomatic recognition). A limited war- such as the Amer-
ican involvement in Vietnam - is an example of an issue with an
asymmetrical impact, since the burden of fighting the war tends to fall
more heavily on some segments of the population than on others.
Apart from symmetry, the other important issue-area characteris-
tic concerns whether exclusively tangible resources are at stake. If
there is nothing symbolic or ideological about a given issue-area, then
the relevant political process will be that of either distribution or reg-
ulation. However, if more than tangible political goods are involved,
then the policy process will be similar to those found in cases of dip-
lomatic interaction, protection of national values (as in a crisis), or
redistribution of status and power.
The combination of an issue-area’s symmetry and tangibility deter-
mine the extent to which decisional participants’ values are at stake.
Figure 1 shows a clockwise movement from minimum to maximum
centrality of the stakes, as a function of changes in the tangibility and
symmetry of given issue-areas. Establishing the degree of an issue-
area’s symmetry and tangibility also should allow for prediction of the
nature of the attendant policy process, the possibilities for which are
arranged in a clockwise continuum: from interaction to distribution,
regulation, redistribution, and finally to protection.
The task for an issue-area model of the politics of superpower
policy-making on issues concerning international institutions is first to
address the questions concerning the attributes of an issue-area, i.e.,
tangibility of stakes and symmetry of impact. Then the model will be
able to predict the expected policy process and provide a sense of how
that process can best be studied. The supposed virtue of employing
the issue-area paradigm is that of developing a richer, more subtle
analysis than is possible &dquo; ... [with] a conception of foreign policy




AN ISSUE-BASED FOREIGN-POLICY PARADIGM
ISSUE-AREA ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET CASE
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the official Soviet view on inter-
dependence in general and the UN in specific has been enthusiastic.
Mikhail Gorbachev (1987) wrote that &dquo;the sphere of rational, respon-
sible organization of international affairs is broadening before our
eyes.... &dquo; Speaking at the UN in December 1988, the Soviet leader
urged states to &dquo; ... carry out a certain revision of their attitude
towards such a unique instrument as the United Nations, without
which world politics is inconceivable.&dquo; The Soviet leader said, more
generally, &dquo;If we are parts, even if different, of one and the same civ-
ilization, if we are aware of the interdependence of the modern world,
this understanding should increasingly manifest itself both in politics,
and in practical efforts to harmonize international relations.&dquo; And,
regarding the world economy, Gorbachev noted that it &dquo; ... is becom-
ing a single organism, outside which no state can develop normally ... &dquo;
(Gorbachev 1988: 2).
Despite Gorbachev’s enthusiasm, a variety of opinions exists in the
Soviet Union concerning interdependence, traditionally a very sensi-
tive issue with both political and economic dimensions. Pravda has fea-
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tured political commentators debating the future of the UN in a lively
fashion (Shakhnazarov 1988 and Bovin 1988). Given that there is in
fact a range of views concerning the conceptual issue of interdepen-
dence and the practical matter of Soviet policy toward international
institutions, I examine contemporary Soviet debates as a useful way to
measure the domestic impact of the issue-area of international institu-
tions. The journals used for the literature review are again MEMO,
Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn and Kommunist.
The debates reveal a range of views on the ideological desirability
of the various forms of cooperation with the non-socialist world. Soviet
attempts at integration with the international capitalist economy are
by some considered &dquo;ideological retreats&dquo; (Shenfield 1987: 73), since
implicit in such efforts is the acknowledgement that the socialist bloc’s
system of international economic relations has not been fully success-
ful. As an alternative to such &dquo;retreats,&dquo; some Soviet discussions of
global problems analyze increased interdependence in terms of a height-
ened role for socialism. Georgi Shakhnazarov, the first deputy head of
the Central Committee Department for Liaison with Communist and
Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries, has said that &dquo;[e]cological prob-
lems require socialist methods.... [As well,] take the World Health
Organization. What is that? That is not a capitalist method, it is - at
least in principle - a socialist method&dquo; (Gleisner 1987: 3).
Soviet thinkers on interdependence have waged debates over two
categories of issues. Within the &dquo;globalistics&dquo; school, conservatives have
been attacked for not comprehending the magnitude of issues such as
AIDS, terrorism, drug addiction and the like. Others have argued that
global problems represent an area of rivalry as well as cooperation
between capitalism and socialism (Shenfield 1987: 62).
Concerning the general question of closer economic ties with the
West, three different strands of thought exist. In 1987 a two-part
review article, in itself a sign of the liveliness of the interdependence
debate, outlined three schools of thought regarding the world econ-
omy. The broad interpretation depicts a truly global economy which
envelops all national economies and links them together by means of
the international division of labor. The narrow approach sees the world
economy as a system based on economic relations between countries,
or even between the separate socialist and capitalist world economies.
The third, or &dquo;intermediate&dquo; approach, seeks a middle way between
the two extremes (Shishkov 1987: 75).
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Gorbachev, supporting the broad interpretation, has introduced
policies aimed at promoting economic interdependence which are also
intended to introduce a competitive atmosphere in which some Soviet
enterprises will flourish while others founder. Another aspect of the
domestic impact of the new Soviet approach to the world economy can
be seen in the ambivalent attitude of Soviet officials in the foreign
trade bureaucracy. Their power has steadily eroded as trade becomes
more decentralized in Gorbachev’s effort to enlarge the Soviet role in
the world economy. (In 1988, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the
State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations were abolished and
replaced by a new Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations.) One
bureaucrat has said, &dquo;I am working myself out of a job. [But] I don’t
know what I’m working myself into&dquo; (Hough 1988: 76).
Gorbachev needs his pro-reform constituency both as a base of
political power and as a resource to make the economic restructuring
work. Given this context, theoretical debates over interdependence
have acquired political importance. Snyder notes that the president of
the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Anatolii Aleksandrov, was fired after
warning that an &dquo;import plague&dquo; was retarding the growth of Soviet
technology and thus endangering national security (1987: 111; also
see Clemens 1990: 178). This episode implies that the domestic impact
of interdependence issues in the U.S.S.R. is not symmetrical.
I conclude that given an issue-area characterized by nonexclusively
tangible goods and asymmetrical domestic impact, the Zimmerman
paradigm would place it in quadrant IV of Figure 1 and expect a
redistributive policy process to accompany the issue-area of interna-
tional institutions. The issue-area of global interdependence and inter-
national institutions evidently has a redistributive effect on the Soviet
polity, draining political power from the conservatives and delivering
it to the Gorbachev constituency. The internal model predicts that
issue-areas with asymmetrical impacts will have attendant policy pro-
cesses that can be analyzed with a group-politics approach. Such a
model would assert that current Soviet 10 policy is a by-product of the
struggle between reformers, who see the pursuit of interdependence as
a viable strategy for the Soviet Union, and conservatives, who are less
eager to abandon a more autarkic approach.
ISSUE-AREA ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. CASE
The task for the issue-area approach with regard to the U.S. case is
to help explain the nature of the policy-making process which has
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been characterized by a reduced interest in international organiza-
tions. Krasner notes that while American willingness to support the
UN and its agencies has not collapsed, &dquo;it has declined&dquo; (1985: 299).
In 1977 the U.S. temporarily withdrew from the International Labor
Organization. In 1982 the U.S. rejected the Law of the Sea Convention
and refused to pay a $1 million UN assessment for a Law of the Sea
commission. The United States quit UNESCO in 1985 and also refused
to participate in a World Court case, involving an ultimately success-
ful suit brought by Nicaragua, for the first time (Krasner 1985: 300).
Survey data on public attitudes in the U.S. toward the United
Nations indicate a general attitude of approval mixed with some dis-
appointment. In 1985 more citizens thought the organization was doing
a very good or good job than a poor or very poor job (51 percent vs.
40 percent). On the fundamental question of whether the world would
be better off without the UN, an overwhelming majority of 78 percent
replied in the negative, with only 13 percent agreeing that the world
would be better off. &dquo;Even among those who said the United Nations
was performing poorly, few wanted to get rid of it&dquo; (New York Times,
June 26, 1985).
When the focus shifts from the U.S. public to the government, the
analysis becomes more complicated. One observer has stated that &dquo;an
anti-UN mood now runs through virtually the entire policy-making
community, Democratic and Republican, and to a large extent the
journalistic and scholarly communities as well&dquo; (Johansen 1986: 614).
However, a brief review of the policy process concerning the U.S.
withdrawal from UNESCO indicates that the existence of anti-UN
sentiment is not equivalent to an anti-UN consensus. A careful study
of U.S. elite and public opinion on the UN concludes, &dquo; ... simulta-
neous support for and criticism of the UN is common to a variety of
’elites’ ... &dquo; (Martin 1983: 300). Unsurprisingly, there was a conten-
tious debate over the UNESCO withdrawal, including a struggle within
the U.S. Congress and a three-way battle among the Congress, the
State Department, and the Reagan White House.
To give a summary account of the events comprising the UNESCO
controversy, an appropriate place to begin is the vote in the House
Foreign Affairs Committee in March 1984 over a proposal to block the
Reagan Administration’s announced intention to leave UNESCO. The
House instead urged the establishment of a commission to study U.S.
differences with the organization. In July, assistant secretary of state
Gregory Newell noted that there was a possibility that the U.S. could
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change its mind about withdrawing. Then, in August, the debate
grew more heated when members of the U.S. National Commission on
UNESCO accused the Reagan Administration of spreading distorted
information to support the decision to withdraw from the UN agency.
In September, the General Accounting Office issued a report highly
critical of UNESCO. U.S. withdrawal was finalized in December
1984. (New York Times 1984: March 2, July 1, August 9, September
21, December 20).
In applying the issue-area paradigm to U.S. policy-making on
international institutions, it is important to recognize the low salience
of UN issues in terms of public opinion. The 1985 New York Times
survey of American citizens found &dquo; ... considerable ignorance about
the United Nations, its mandate, and its activities.&dquo; This ignorance
may be a function of the fact that for issues such as the withdrawal
from UNESCO, there is little at stake for most citizens. Furthermore,
any stakes which may exist would tend to affect most citizens in the
same way. In other words, it is reasonable to state that the domestic
impact of the international-institutions issue-area in the U.S. is
symmetrical.
As to the tangibility of the political goods involved in the
international-institutions issue-area, resource allocation has been an
important component of the policy debate. The Kassebaum Amend-
ment, designed to stimulate UN budget reforms, manifests a concern
with tangible political goods; the same may be said for U.S. objections
to wasteful UNESCO expenditures. Nonetheless, much of the debate
in the U.S. on UN policy has focused on symbolic issues revolving
around conflicts between unilateral and multilateral approaches to
world issues, such as the collective management of seabed mining
mandated by the Law of the Sea treaty.
The combination of symmetrical domestic impact and
nonexclusively tangible political goods suggests that in the U.S. case,
the international-institutions issue-area should be located in quadrant
III of Figure 1, which is the protection/interaction arena. In this arena,
&dquo; ... participants in the process [i.e., the Congress, the Executive
branch, and the attentive public] act as individuals rather than as
spokesmen for groups, institutions, or major strata of society&dquo; (Zim-
merman 1973: 1205). The crucial difference from the Soviet case is
the symmetry of impact, the presence of which in the U.S. case tends
to mute the role of domestic politics. I believe that the finding of asym-
metry in the Soviet case is due to the linkage of the pro-UN, pro-
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interdependence outlook with Gorbachev’s overall reform package. This
linkage politicizes the Soviet domestic policy process regarding the
UN, so that even if Soviet data directly analogous to those available
for the American case were available, they would likely not affect my
basic conclusion.
CONCLUSION
In this research note I have examined different indicators of Soviet
and U.S. approaches to international institutions. Due to acknowledged
(and to my mind, unavoidable) limitations in comparability between
the data sets for the two countries, I am wary of making any wide-
ranging theoretical claims based on this study. However, I believe that
I have shown that the issue-area approach is a useful one for studying
Soviet and U.S. attitudes and policy-making concerning international
organizations.
Despite data limitations, my preliminary application of the issue-
area model to Soviet and U. S. policies and attitudes regarding inter-
national organizations suggests that there are unique aspects to the
Soviet debate on IOs. The main finding in the case of the U.S.S.R. is
the strong connection between specific UN-related issues and the larger
conceptual question of the proper Soviet stance toward global interde-
pendence. Furthermore, many of the issues subsumed under the rubric
of &dquo;interdependence&dquo; touch on value-laden topics such as autarky and
the class-based view of international relations. On the U.S. side, the
indicators which I examined provide little evidence of a similar link-
age between central values and debates about 10s.
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